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Abstract 
 
Corporate mail services are designed to perform 
better than public mail services. Fast mail delivery, 
large size file transfer as an attachments, high level 
spam and virus protection, commercial advertisement 
free environment are some of the advantages worth to 
mention. But these mail services are frequent target of 
hackers and spammers. Distributed Denial of service 
attacks are becoming more common and sophisticated. 
The researchers have proposed various solutions to 
the DDOS attacks.  Can we stop these kinds of attacks 
with available technology? These days the DDoS 
attack through spam has increased and disturbed the 
mail services of various organizations. Spam 
penetrates through all the filters to establish DDoS 
attacks, which causes serious problems to users and 
the data. In this paper we propose a multilayer 
approach to defend DDoS attack caused by spam 
mails. This approach is a combination of fine tuning of 
source filters, content filters, strictly implementing 
mail policies, educating user, network monitoring and 
logical solutions to the ongoing attack.  We have 
conducted several experiments in corporate mail 
services; the results show that this approach is highly 
effective to prevent DDoS attack caused by spam. The 
defense mechanism reduced 60% of the incoming spam 
traffic and repelled many DDoS attacks caused by 
spam  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Email is a source of communication for millions of 
people world wide [8]. But spam is abruptly disturbing 
the email users by eating their resource, time & money. 
In Internet community the spam has always been 
considered as bulk and unsolicited.  Spam mails 
accounts for 70% of the entire mail traffic [1]. Many 
researchers have proposed different solutions to stop 
the spam. But the effort has become a drop of water in 
the ocean. No matter how hard, spammers always find 
new ways to deliver spam mail to the user’s inbox. Of 
late the spammers target the mail servers to disturb the 
activities of organizations which results in economic 
and reputation loss. The DDoS attack is a common 
mode of attack to cripple the particular server. The 
spammers take DDoS attack in their arms to disturb the 
mail servers. This paper is going to study the DDoS 
attacks through spam mails. We proposed a multi layer 
approach to defend the DDoS attack caused by spam 
mails. We implemented this methodology in our mail 
system and monitored the results. The result shows that 
our approach is very effective to defend DDoS attack 
caused by spam. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides background on mechanism of DDOS attack 
through spam and the effects. In section 3, we describe 
our mechanism to defend the attack. Section 4 
provides data Collection and experimental results. We 
conclude in section 5. 
 
2. Mechanism of DDoS attacks through 
Spam 
 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a large 
scale, coordinated attack on the availability of services 
at a victim system or network resource [3]. DDOS 
attack through spam mail is one of the new versions of 
common DDoS attack. In this type, the attacker 
penetrates the network by a small program attached to 
the spam mail. After the execution of the attached file, 
the mail server resources will be eaten up by mass 
mails from other machines in the domain results denial 
of services. The working scenario of this attack is 
explained in fig 1. The attackers take maximum effort 
to pass through the spam filters and deliver the spam 
mail to the user’s inbox. Here the hackers are doing 
enough to make the mail recipient to believe that the 
spam mail is from the legitimate user. The attackers 
use fake email ids from victim domains to penetrate 
the network. The spam mail had sent in the name of 
Network administrator/well wisher of the victim or 
boss of the organization. Note that the spam mail does 
not have the signature. 
 
 
Figure 1. Attack scenario 
 
The spam contains small size of .exe file as an 
attachment (for example update.exe). The attackers 
used double file extension to confuse the filter 
(Update_KB2546_*86.BAK.exe (140k)) and user. The 
attachment size ranges from 140 to 180 KB. Mostly 
the spam mail asks the recipient to execute the .exe file 
to update anti virus software. Upon execution of the 
attachment, it will drop new files in windows folder 
and change the registry file, link to the attacker’s 
website to download big programs to harm the network 
further. The infected machine collected email 
addresses through windows address book and 
automatically send mails to others in the same domain. 
Even if the users don’t use mail service programs like 
Outlook express and others, it will send mails by using 
its own SMTP. Mostly this kind of spam mail attracts 
the group mail ids, and will send mails to groups. By 
sending mails to the group, it will spread the attack 
vigorously.  If any of the users forward this mail to 
others it will worsen the situation. Ultimately the 
server will receive enormous request from others 
beyond its processing capacity.  In this way it will 
spread the attack and results in a DDoS attack. After 
the first mail, for every minute it will send same kind 
of mail with different subject name & different 
contents to the group email ids. Rapidly it will eat up 
server resources and end up in distributed denial of 
service attack. The names of the worms used in these 
kind of DDoS attacks are 
WORM_start.Bt,WORM_STRAT.BG,WORM_STRA
T.BR, TROJ_PDROPPER.Q. Upon execution, these 
worms dropped files namely serv.exe, serv.dll, serv.s, 
serv.wax, E1.dll, rasaw32t.dll etc. 
DDoS malware cause direct and indirect damage by 
flooding specific targets [14]. Mass mailers and 
network worms cause indirect damage when they clog 
mail servers and network bandwidth. In Network, It 
will consume the network bandwidth and resources, 
causing slow mail delivery further resulting Denial of 
service. The server will be down due to enormous 
request from clients and bulk mail processing. 
 
3. Proposed Defense Mechanism 
 
Figure 2.Defense Mechanism Layers 
 
We proposed a multi layer approach to defend the 
DDoS attack caused by spam mails [Figure 2]. We 
implemented this approach in our mail system and 
monitored the results. The result shows that our 
approach is very effective. The approach has six layers 
as shown in fig.2. This approach is a combination of 
fine tuning of source filters, content filters, network 
monitoring policy, general email policies, educating 
the user & timely logical solutions of a network 
administrator. Fine tuning of source filters reject the 
incoming connections before the spam mail delivery. 
The content filters analyses the contents of the mails 
and blocks the incoming unwanted mails. Network 
monitoring approach provides general solution to 
identify the attacks prior to the attack and also during 
the attack. Business houses should educate the user 
about possible attack scenarios & reacting ways to it. 
The logical solutions of the network administrator play 
an important role during the attack period and even 
post attack period. The combination of these layers 
provides best methodology to stop the DDoS attacks 
established though spam mails. 
 
3.1. Source Filters 
 
There is a prediction that the spam will be 70% of 
the email traffic in 2007[1]. There are lot of source 
filters are available in real time. But by simply 
enabling all the filters will not help to prevent the 
attacks. It will slow down the mail delivery process. So 
the fine tuning of filter is an important to handle the 
attacks. The figure .3 shows the structure of the filters. 
 
3.1.1. Bayesian Filter. Bayesian filtering is one of the 
effective filtering technologies used by most of the 
antispam software developers [9]. This filter works 
based on the mathematical theorem of Bayes a British 
mathematician. 
 
 
Figure 3. Combination of Source Filters 
 
 Anti spam companies have developed various 
algorithms by modifying the Bayes theorem to 
effectively filter the spam. In Bayes methodology, the 
system develops two tables from the contents of 
incoming spam mail & out bound legitimate mails. The 
tables referred as a dictionary. Each word from an 
incoming new mail will be compared to the spam mail 
table and legitimate mail table or dictionary. For 
incoming mail words, the probability value is 
calculated based on the number of occurrences of 
particular word in spam mail table & legitimate mail 
table. 
3.1.2. DNSBL. Even though the spam generation is 
not accepted widely as a legal actively, 80% of the 
spam mail is generated by particular users. If we have 
the list of these spam generators IP addresses, we can 
effectively block the spam messages. DNSBL is 
based on the concept above said. DNS black hole list 
or black list is a well defined source filtering 
technology it works before delivering the mail to the 
user’s inbox. The list publishes the list of IP 
addresses through DNS of massive spam generators. 
Lot of DNSBLs offers various list of IP addresses 
based on open relay, spam or virus source. The most 
widely used DNSBLs are spamhaus, spamcop,sorbs, 
abuseat,dsbl, rfc-ignorant etc., these DNSBLs list out 
thousands of IP addresses of spam generators. Some 
DNSBLs will check the particular IP address 
regularly; if they stop the spamming activity, it will 
remove the particular IP address and add the new IP 
addresses of spammers [2].  
Moreover these list providers are frequent target to 
hackers. The spammers used Mimail.E worm to 
perform Dos attack on spamhaus site. In 2003, 
Spamhaus servers came under distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks by thousands of virus-
infected computers throughout the Internet [20]. In 
2006 also the spamhaus servers are out of service due 
to DDoS attacks [25]. It is clear that the angry 
spammers are trying to stop the services of DNSBLs. 
These attacks clearly show the use more than one 
DNSBLs in the List. Even if one DNS black list is 
out of service the mail server can manage with other 
lists. In recent days the DNSBL lookups are 
increased tremendously of total DNS lookups 
compared to 5 years before [1]. Nearly 80% of the 
spam generated by relays that appear in one at least 
one of eight major blacklists [4]. Fine tuning of 
multiple black lists is more effective than simply 
using all lists. The DNSBLs is not effective when the 
spam is being sent from larger set of IP addresses [2]. 
3.1.3. SURBL. SURBL Searches for URLs in 
incoming mails. SURBL is a collection of spam 
supported websites, domains, web servers. If there is 
any URL or IP address in the message, the system will 
contact the SURBL list to check whether the URL is 
listed. If the URL is listed in SURBLs, it blocks the 
messages.  The available SURBL lists are sc.surbl.org, 
ws.surbl.org, ob.surbl.org, ab.surbl.org. multi.surbl.org 
is a combination of all the lists. If the system uses 
other SURBLs with multi.surbl.org, it will take long 
time to process the mail. If use only multi.surbl.org for 
SURBL check, and if the service is not available, no 
checks will be performed. We recommend using other 
four surbls rather than multi.surbl.org. The 
administrator can edit the list whenever a high rate of 
false positive is present. [17] 
In the mentioned DDoS attack through spam [in 
section 2], the worm downloaded malicious code from 
the following websites. 
http://www2.{BLOCKED}tinmdesachlion.com 
http://www3.{BLOCKED}tinmdesachlion.com 
http://www4.{BLOCKED}tinmdesachlion.com 
http://www6.{BLOCKED}tinmdesachlion.com 
 If SURBL was enabled, there was less possibility of 
the attack. This kind of URL based filter is very 
effective against the DDoS attack since these 
references are faked websites. Some attacker includes 
multi URLs to confuse the filters. For multi domain 
messages, it is hard to determine the real spam domain 
among all the domains [10]. The combination of 
checking SURBL database with other filters is a best 
way to defend the DDoS attacks.  
3.1.4. Sender Policy Framework. Sender Policy 
Framework reject message if SPF test is fail or soft 
fail [23]. Sender address forgery is a big threat to the 
users as well as the entire network. In the attack 
mentioned in the section 2, all the users received 
mails from the unknown person within their 
organization. The attacker’s mail id is a fake, it has 
victims domain name. That is why most of the users 
obeyed the instruction and executed the file 
attachment leading to the DDoS attack. We can stop 
this kind of forgery by SPF (Sender Policy 
Framework).The current version of SPF — called 
SPFv1 or SPF Classic [13].  
3.1.5. Grey Listing. Grey listing is a simple 
technique to fight against spam [18]. It will reject all 
incoming mails from unfamiliar IP addresses with an 
error code. The mail server records the combination 
of sender, recipient id & IP address. If the same 
sender is trying to send the mail after 10 seconds to 
12 hours, the server will check for the combination in 
its record, if it matches, it will allow the sender to 
deliver the message. This is based on assumption that 
the spammers will not try again but legitimate users. 
But spammers learned this technology & how to 
bypass. But results show that there is substantial 
reduction of spam after the implementation of grey 
listing. The old version of Grey list used to accept the 
second mail after 4 hours [19]. But the legitimate user 
faces delay in mail delivery.  
3.1.6. Reverse DNS. The incoming system should 
have rDNS ie. The sending system should give domain 
name and IP address to prove that is from the 
legitimate user.  Most of the spam doesn’t have reverse 
DNS [12]. Rejecting all incoming mails without rDNS 
is an effective way to filter the spam. “Reject message 
if sending server IP does not have a reverse DNS 
entry”, “Reject message if the reverse DNS entry does 
not match Helo host” are two options supported by 
most mail services. SPF & rDNS are useful to filter the 
spam into some extends.  
 
3.2. Content Filters 
 
Once cleared from the SMTP server, the sender is 
allowed to deliver the message headers and body of 
the mail [12]. By carefully checking each and every 
word of the header and contents still we can block the 
spam. Most spam headers try to confuse the filters. 
Spammers will use recognizable words as a subject 
and clear from address. If the incoming mail has 
particular content or subject, the content filter will 
stop the mail delivery. Most of the spam caused 
DDOS attack has subjects like test, server report, 
status, helo etc; In this case the attacker carefully 
selected the words to avoid the content filtering. 
“Server report” is a word used by servers to send 
report to the administrator. The content filter blocks 
the mail which has some specific words like Viagra, 
ViAgRa, install updates, customer support service 
etc., Multiple words separated by comma, space are 
allowed in content filters to search the mail contents. 
The content filters can block the mails with particular 
type of files as an attachment [12].  
 
3.3. Policies 
 
Mail is the primary source of communication between 
all employees at an organization. Therefore it is 
appropriate that an email-etiquette be established to 
distinguish between what is Push vs. Pull information. 
As any organization of any size, it needs an agreed 
upon system of sending, sorting and utilizing files in 
their mail server. The type and number of emails / files 
sent via mail has increased exponentially over the past 
few years. If the server reaches its capacity levels that 
cause significant delay in email ultimately results 
DOS. The policy helps to avoid the DDoS attack kind 
of situations. 
 
3.4. Educate the user 
 
The user’s action during the attack and before the 
attack plays an important role to defend the DDoS 
attacks. So the users need to be educated how to 
behave generally and during the attack. The users have 
to be educated about spam mails and DDoS attacks. 
The users should be asked not to open or reply or 
forward or any kind of activities to the mails from 
unknown users. The user should inform the network 
administrator, if they responded to the spam in any 
method. The user can choose to flag spam so that the 
server knows to block it. The users should be asked not 
to use their work email addresses when registering in 
news groups and others. They should also be asked not 
to run any exe file or any file sent by email. 
Automatically deleting spam after particular day 
should be implemented. If not user should be advised 
to clean up their spam regularly. After the attack if 
spam mail exists with DDoS attack weapon, by error it 
can reappear and results DDoS attack. So the users 
should clear their old mail and spam regularly. 
 
3.5. Monitoring the Network  
 
To defend network against DDoS attack through spam 
requires real time monitoring of network wide traffic 
to obtain timely and important information. Monitoring 
the performance of network plays an important role to 
avert the DDOS attack [14]. Unusual activities can be 
detected, if the network is monitored by 24*7. If the 
speed of the mail service is down, we can assume that 
the server is processing a bulk data. Even the heavy 
regular network traffic causes the congestion; the 
administrator can regulate the data flow by his regular 
procedures to increase the speed. But during the attack, 
the net admin can not ease the data flow by his regular 
practices. It indicates that there is something wrong in 
the network. If the DDoS attack takes place 
automatically the mail server’s speed will go down. 
Continuously monitoring the network performance is a 
useful practice to defend the attack.  
 
3.6. Logical solutions 
 
Any attack can be handled with minimum impact by 
the network administrator’s skills. After the attack, 
shutting down the server is not useful. The ways 
should be identified to change the path of the data 
dumping. The DDoS attack through spam mail 
targeted only group ids. So the mail service will 
become out of service very soon. But the wise net 
administrator can change all the group ids to new ids. 
For example allstaff@ABC.com can be changed in to 
all_staff@ABC.com.  These group mail ids are 
converted into private users and not for public users. 
So the attacker is not allowed to send more mails. 
Since the incoming spam has diverted, all the spam 
mails stopped immediately. But already infected 
machines will give trouble to the particular users. The 
infected machines need to be removed from the 
network. In order to view the impact of the attack, 
these machines have to be analyzed. After the removal 
of worms from these machines, they can be allowed to 
join the network. There will be a logical solution to 
every attack, no need to be panic. 
 
4. Data Collection and Results  
 
We have conducted several experiments to measure 
the effectiveness of SURBL and the proposed defense 
mechanism. The test was conducted on client 
computers connected through local area network. The 
web server provides service to 200 users with 20 group 
email IDs and 200 individual mail IDs. The speed of 
the Internet connection is 100 Mpbs for the LAN, with 
20 Mbps upload and download speed (Due to security 
and privacy concerns we are not able to disclose the 
real domain name). Our dataset consists of the spam 
mails collected at a large spam trap. The trap is a 
collection of spam mails filtered by source, content 
filters, and other settings mentioned in this paper. 
We conducted several experiments to measure the 
effectiveness of SURBL.  To test the SURBL, we 
observed mail delivery for particular period of time 
(sessions). Each session is about 3 hours period of 
time. The experiment result shows that the 
effectiveness of the SURBL test. Our dataset consists 
of the spam mails collected at a large spam trap. 
 
 
Figure 4. SURBL test-Spam delivery 
 
The number of spam had increased to the user’s inbox 
when the SURBL test is not conducted to check the 
spam; at the same time the number spam has decreased 
to the spam trap. SURBL test was unchecked for five 
sessions. Most of the users received spam in their 
inbox during this test. The results are shown in the 
Figure 4. 
Several experiments were conducted to measure the 
effectiveness of the proposed defense mechanism. We 
observed the system for six months continuously. Our 
dataset consists of the spam mails collected at a large 
spam trap. The graph shows the number of spam 
received before and after implementing the defense 
mechanism. We have selected five sessions of data to 
display. As shown in Figure 5, a session holds good 
for three hours. The graph shows that after 
implementing the defense mechanism the incoming 
spam has reduced by 50% to 60%. Our corporate mail 
service did not face any DDoS attack for past six 
months. We have observed that the individual users are 
not receiving more spam like before implementing the 
defense mechanism. 
 
 
Figure 5. Defense Mechanism effects 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have proposed a multi layer 
defense mechanism to defend the mail services from 
DDoS attacks caused by spam. Experimental results 
show that this system is highly effective and the mail 
service experiencing strong protection against DDoS 
attacks caused by spam. There is no single step 
solution to the DDoS attacks established through spam 
mails. Simply using various filters doesn’t help to stop 
the possible DDoS attacks caused by spam. But fine 
tuning of filters mentioned in our mechanism 
prevented DDoS attacks through spam. The content 
filters clogged the attack by filtering the spam with 
unwanted contents and programs. Continuous 
monitoring of the network averted possible attacks and 
gave enough time to defend the attacks. Since the 
educated users are responding well to this kind of 
attacks, the attacks avoided in an efficient way. The 
policies prevented the spam mails by utilizing policies 
of using signatures, no bulk mails, and the limitations 
of usage of group ids. Last but certainly not the least, 
the logical solutions to these attacks plays an important 
role to stop the attacks.  The experiments show the 
effectiveness of SURBL to filter the spam. The 
experimental results show that there is 60% of 
reduction in spam traffic after implementing the 
defense mechanism. Also we didn’t face DDoS attack 
through spam for past six months. 
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